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Environmental regulation and the cross-border diffusion of new
technology: Evidence from automobile patents

Abstract
We examine the impact of environmental regulation on the international diffusion of
new technology through the patent system. We employ a dataset of automobile
emission standards between 1992 and 2007 and corresponding data on cross-border
patent inflows of technologies developed to comply with these standards. Our analysis,
based on a research design of country pair years, shows it is “regulatory distance”
between countries rather than absolute regulatory stringency per se that matters for
cross-border patent inflows: the transfer of compliance technologies rises when
regulatory standards in the inventor and the recipient countries become “closer”.
Consistent with this main result, we find that in aggregate destination countries only
receive a larger total inflow of patents as a consequence of regulatory tightening if their
previous regulatory standard is below that of the major innovating source countries.
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1. Introduction
There is widespread agreement that the enhanced cross-border diffusion of
environmentally sound technologies (ESTs)1 is key to addressing environmental
problems (WCED 1987; Stern 2007; Popp 2011; Beyer and Urpelainen forthcoming).
Technology transfer is particularly significant for developing countries because they are
rapidly adding new capacity and, moreover, the vast majority of ESTs are still developed
in OECD countries (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011).
The question of how to accelerate the cross-border transfer of ESTs has
stimulated a debate about the role of government policy. Much of the existing
controversy in this area has surrounded intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the
degree to which strengthening IPR regimes helps or hinders the international diffusion
of new technology (see, for example, ICTSD 2008; Hall and Helmers 2010; Ockwell et al.
2011). By contrast, the impact of public environmental regulation on cross-border
transfers of new ESTs has proved less controversial, typically been underpinned by a
general assumption that tighter domestic environmental regulation automatically
increases the transfer of ESTs (Tébar Less and McMillan 2005; Gallagher 2006). Indeed,
a number of past studies support this assumption, showing a positive relationship
between domestic regulatory stringency and inflows of compliance technologies
(Lanjouw and Mody 1996; Popp et al. 2011; Dekker et al. 2012).
However, not all works show that more stringent domestic environmental
regulation stimulates the international diffusion of ESTs. For example, Popp (2006)
finds that tighter air pollution standards in the power sector in the US did not result in

1

ESTs are defined by Agenda 21 as technologies which ‘protect the environment, are less polluting, use all

resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes and products, and handle residual
wastes in a more acceptable manner than the technologies for which they were substitutes.’
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higher levels of transfers from Germany and Japan, but only greater local innovative
efforts. In addition, empirical studies into the relationship between regulation and
technology transfer suffer from various shortcomings. First, they do not use measures
which directly capture actual regulatory stringency, with the majority instead relying on
proxies such as pollution abatement expenditure (e.g. Lanjouw and Mody 1996) or
ratification of international environmental agreements (e.g. Dekker et al. 2012). Second,
existing studies are mainly based on fairly small samples, particularly in terms of the
number of recipient countries (e.g. Popp et al. 2011). Third, existing work has almost
exclusively focused on environmental process standards, thereby neglecting the
potentially crucial role of environmental product standards in stimulating the
international transfer of ESTs.
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the role that environmental
regulation plays in the international transfer of compliance-related technologies based
on a newly constructed panel data set that combines the level of motor vehicle
emissions product standards in 72 countries between 1992 and 2007 with patent filings
in corresponding automotive emissions reduction technologies. National emission
standards are all expressed in terms of European Union (EU) standards equivalent,
making it possible to compare the regulatory level both across countries and across
time. We complement these regulatory data with data on non-resident patents
protecting technologies that are developed specifically to comply with automotive
emissions standards. Data on inventors' country of residence for these patents allow us
to measure cross-border technology flows, following an established tradition in the
literature (Chan 2010; Dechezleprêtre et al. 2013; Dekker et al. 2012; Eaton and Kortum
1999; Lanjouw and Mody 1996; Perkins and Neumayer 2011; Popp et al. 2011; Yang
and Kuo 2007). To mitigate the well-known problem that many patent applications

3
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relate to technologies of low value, our outcome measure focuses on those patents that,
after scrutiny, were actually granted by the foreign patent office, as opposed to the more
expansive category of all patent applications.2 During our sample period, 183,000
patents in automobile pollution-control technologies were granted worldwide to nonresidents.
Our main argument and findings can be summarized as follows: what matters for
inflows of ESTs is not domestic regulatory stringency as such, but the level of regulation
relative to potential source3 countries, or what we call regulatory distance. Indeed, we
find strong and robust evidence that countries receive more non-resident patents from
source countries whose level of regulation moves closer to their own. An increase in
regulatory stringency simultaneously raises patent inflows from countries that have a
higher regulatory level and decrease patent transfers from countries with lower
regulation levels. Once we control for regulatory distance, absolute regulatory
stringency in potential destination countries of technology inflows completely ceases to
matter. Therefore the impact of absolute regulatory stringency on the total number of
patent inflows is a priori ambiguous and depends on the country’s regulatory position
relative to that of major inventor countries.
Our paper relates to two strands of existing literature. First, our study draws
from, and contributes to, work on the international diffusion of technology (Saggi 2002;
Keller 2004). This literature has identified three channels through which new
technology flows and where patent protection is frequently used: trade in goods, foreign
direct investment and licensing (Smith 2001; Eaton and Kortum 2002; Branstetter et al.
2006). Work in this area has also sought to explore the domestic conditions which

2

Our results are robust to using all filed patent applications, however.

3

Note, we use the terms source and inventor country interchangeably.
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facilitate and impede the (successful) diffusion of new embodied and disembodied
technological knowledge.
Second, our paper relates to the literature investigating the links between
environmental policy and the cross-border diffusion of ESTs. Empirical work on this
topic has mainly relied on survey data (Veugelers 2012), CDM projects data
(Dechezleprêtre et al. 2008; Schmid 2012) and patent data (Dekker et al. 2012; Haščič et
al. 2010; Haščič and Johnstone 2011; Popp et al. 2011; Verdolini and Galeotti 2011).
None of these papers analyses the impact of relative regulatory stringency (regulatory
distance) on technology diffusion.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our arguments regarding
the relationship between environmental regulation and the international diffusion of
technology. Section 3 explains why the automobile sector constitutes a good test-case
for our hypotheses. Data are presented in Section 4 and the research design described
in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results and robustness tests. A final section
concludes.

2. The relationship between environmental regulation and international
technology diffusion
Environmental regulation provides an economic incentive for regulated parties to
acquire compliance technology. The question addressed in the present paper is whether
this regulation-induced demand is likely to stimulate foreign owners of ESTs to transfer
their technologies to the regulating home country. The answer is likely to depend, in
part, on whether there exists pre-existing technologies abroad to supply this demand. In
the case of regulatory frontrunners (i.e. those who lead in the introduction of the most
stringent policy), regulatory tightening may well be supplied by domestic innovation,

5
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not least because there is no sufficient supply of compliance technologies abroad. While
demand-side incentives in one country may of course stimulate innovation in other
countries and thus increase the supply of foreign EST potentially transferable (de la
Tour et al. 2011; Peters et al. 2012), evidence suggests that the impact of domestic
policies on innovation is much stronger than that of foreign policies (Dechezleprêtre
and Glachant 2012). In fact, in the passenger car sector which forms the focus of the
present study, early-regulating countries such as Japan, Germany and US established an
early lead in the innovation of pollution reduction and control technologies (Gerard and
Lave 2005; Lee et al. 2011). Available case-study evidence shows that the adoption of
stringent regulation in regulatory leader countries has also stimulated predominantly
domestic innovation of ESTs in other sectors (Beise and Rennings 2005; Brandt and
Svendsen 2006; Popp 2006).
However, once a particular compliance technology has been domestically
developed to comply with a specific domestic standard, the adoption of similar
environmental standards elsewhere may lead inventors to transfer their technology to
these jurisdictions (Beise and Rennings 2005; Huber 2008). Inventors in earlyregulating (“leader”) source countries are likely to possess a competitive advantage visà-vis potential domestic competitors in later-regulating (“follower”) countries,
stemming from the fact that their pre-existing compliance technologies benefit from
dynamic scale economies and learning effects (Porter and van der Linde 1995; Brandt
and Svendsen 2006). This, in turn, provides an incentive for inventors in source

6
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countries to transfer their technologies to recipient countries which adopt similar
standards to their own in response to growing demand.4
Importantly, differences between regulatory followers and leaders would
suggest that the transfer of newly-innovated technologies by patent holders will not be
a simple positive function of regulatory stringency in the recipient country, with stricter
regulations necessarily leading to more filing of EST patents from inventing countries.
Instead, such filings should be greater where recipient country j adopts environmental
standards similar to those in source country i, the economy in which the technology was
originally designed to achieve compliance. That is, we expect the transfer of new ESTs
through the patent system to be a function of regulatory “distance” between sending
and receiving countries, i.e. the gap between regulatory standards in i and j. A similar
point is made by Haščič and Johnstone (2009) who invoke the idea of a “ladder” of
increasingly costly ESTs capable of complying with more stringent environmental
policies. According to the authors, individual countries’ position on this ladder is
determined by their domestic regulation, with technologies consistent with domestic
firms’ profit maximisation transferred from countries ‘situated on the same rung of the
ladder’.
Based on this logic, it would follow that the implications of domestic regulatory
changes will depend on whether the level of regulation in the (potential) recipient
country is higher or lower than the one in the (potential) source country. Specifically,
where domestic environmental regulatory stringency in country j is lower than in
country i, we expect regulatory tightening in the former closer to levels found in the

4

Indeed, the rising value of their proprietary technology implies that foreign firms will want to protect

their technology from imitation, particularly if there are other potential competitors in the recipient
market.
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latter to increase foreign patent filings. The underlying logic is that the adoption of more
stringent standards will necessitate the uptake of compliance technologies in country j
which can readily be supplied by firms in country i owing to their previous domestic
experience of innovating to comply with these standards (Beise and Rennings 2005).
Conversely, where standards in the (potential) recipient country j are already higher
than the ones in the (potential) source country i, i.e. on a higher rung of Haščič and
Johnstone’s (2009) regulatory ladder, a further regulatory tightening of standards in
country j should lead to fewer transfers from i to j. Simply put, firms in country i are less
likely to have innovated compliance technologies required to comply with standards
which are more stringent than those required domestically, and will therefore be even
less able to supply foreign demand in country j, as the regulatory distance between
countries i and j increases further. We therefore predict that:
H1. More newly-innovated ESTs will be transferred from source country i to recipient
country j where the regulatory distance between the two countries becomes smaller.
Applied within a global context, this hypothesis would suggest that absolute
regulatory tightening in countries which lag the major source countries of ESTs is likely
to lead to higher absolute numbers of inward patent filings, as the regulatory distance
between the respective countries shrinks. These laggards will include developing
countries, whose standards are invariably below those found in the major innovators of
ESTs, which are all high-regulating developed economies. Conversely, for similar
reasons of regulatory distance, the domestic tightening of environmental standards in
countries which are at or higher than the level of regulation in major source countries is
likely to lead to a reduction in transfers through the patent system. This will inevitably
mean frontrunner developed economies. In other words, the effect of domestic

8
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regulatory stringency on the total number of patents taken out by foreign
owners/inventors of ESTs will depend on the relative regulatory position of countries,
such that regulatory tightening will have different implications in regulatory leaders
and followers. We explicitly test this logical extension from our first hypothesis in our
empirical analysis and thus formulate as our second hypothesis:
H2. A recipient country that tightens its regulatory standards will receive a higher
absolute number of newly-innovated ESTs if it is lagging in regulatory standards behind
the major innovating countries. In contrast, regulatory tightening in a country that is at or
above the standard in major innovating countries will not receive more newly-innovated
ESTs.

3. The automobile sector
The automobile sector offers several analytical advantages as a test case for our
hypotheses. First, a large number of countries have adopted tailpipe emission
standards, with significant cross-national variations in regulatory stringency over the
period of our study (Beise and Rennings 2005). The sector therefore lends itself to
testing our hypotheses focusing on regulatory distance between countries. Second,
complying with tailpipe emission standards is largely achieved through base-engine and
after-treatment technologies, allowing us to examine the degree to which regulation
drives the transfer of ESTs through the patent system (Haščič et al. 2009; Perkins 2007;
Gallagher 2006). Third, the automobile sector is a transnational assembly industry
wherein components, systems and modules are produced and assembled across a
number of different countries (Dicken 2011). It is also an industry in which external
suppliers play a significant role, not only in manufacturing, but also in technological
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innovation. A relatively small number of European, Japanese, US and South Korean
multinational final producers dominate the industry worldwide. The past decade has
also witnessed the rapid growth of Chinese manufacturers – many of them working
with various foreign partners. These producers offer a variety of models and are in
significant competition with each other for customers who can relatively easily switch
between different brands. The production of passenger cars themselves is
geographically concentrated in a number of macro-regions (largely Europe, North
America and Asia) and, within these regions, a small number of countries account for a
large share of output. A much larger number of countries, however, have some
involvement in the automotive production chain.
One implication of the above is that the automobile industry is a competitive one
which, in many segments of the market, is highly price-sensitive. This has consequences
for technology, including environmental ones, in that achieving higher levels of
emissions performance involves more costly compliance technologies (Perkins 2007).
As a result, manufacturers typically engineer vehicles to comply with domestic
emissions standards in any one particular market in which they are sold, even though
variants of the same model may be sold in other markets configured to higher/lower
emission standards. Another corollary of the structure of the automobile industry is that
technology transfer (and associated non-resident patenting) is a key feature as
technologies are transferred between parts of multinational production networks and
associated suppliers in different countries. These technologies include newly-innovated
ESTs.

10
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4. Data
4.1 Automobile emission regulation data
Data for environmental product standards governing maximum permissible levels of
tailpipe emissions for pollutants from new (gasoline) automobiles were sourced from a
dataset originally constructed by the authors (Perkins and Neumayer 2012). Our
analysis covers the period 1992-2007.5 Countries’ regulatory stringency is coded on a
scale of 0 to 5. The basis of the classification scheme is the European Union’s (EU)
“Euro” emission standards which were originally implemented across member states in
1992 (Euro 1) and have subsequently been tightened in a series of incremental steps
(Euro 2, 3, etc.). The regulations govern maximum permissible levels of tailpipe
emissions for several criteria pollutants (such as CO and NOx) from new passenger car
vehicles.
A significant number of non-EU states which have sought to substantively
address passenger car emissions have used the Euro standards as the basis of their own
emission standards, including many developing countries, meaning that it is possible to
readily code changes in regulatory stringency. Other countries have adopted non-EU
standards, most notably, Japan and the US, together with a set of countries which have
adopted variants of these two major auto producers’ standards. In these cases,
regulatory stringency was converted to the equivalent Euro standard, see Perkins and
Neumayer (2012).
Countries were coded 0 if they had no national emissions standards in place for
new vehicles, or if standards were less stringent than the equivalent of Euro 1, during
the year in question. Countries where Euro 1 or its equivalent was legally enforceable

5

1992 is the first year for which we have data on environmental regulatory stringency, while 2007 is the

last reliable year in the September 2010 version of the PATSTAT database.
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were coded 1, and so on, with 5 for countries having implemented the equivalent of the
Euro 5 standard. As shown in figures 1 and 2, respectively, our sample period is
characterised by regulatory tightening in automobile emission standards across both
developed (OECD) and developing (non-OECD) countries. As one would expect,
developed economies have been regulatory frontrunners, while developing ones have
been laggards.

4.2. Patent data
Our patent data were obtained from the World Patent Statistical Database, otherwise
known as PATSTAT, maintained by the European Patent Office (PATSTAT 2010). We
extracted all the patents filed in seven categories of automotive emissions abatement
technology: air-fuel ratio devices; fuel injection technologies; catalytic converters and
other post-combustion devices; positive crankcase ventilation systems; exhaust gas
recirculation valves; on-board diagnostic systems; and oxygen, NOx and temperature
sensors. Relevant patent applications were determined using International Patent
Classification (IPC) codes identified by Haščič et al. (2009) and Vollebergh (2010). The
list of IPC codes used in our analysis is provided in Appendix 1.
Information about the patent office that receives the patent was used to identify
countries to which a particular invention has been transferred. Our main outcome
measure focuses on patents that were eventually granted by the foreign patent office.
Our estimation sample comprises 183,101 patents granted in 45 destination countries
(listed in Appendix 2). Although we restrict our main focus on granted patents, patents
are counted by the year of their application, as the date of grant is mostly determined by
administrative idiosyncrasies of the various patent offices. In addition, we check the
robustness of our results to using all patent applications filed. We do so for two reasons:

12
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First, some patent offices do not provide information on whether patent applications
were eventually granted. Hence, by additionally analyzing patent applications we take a
larger sample of destination countries into account (namely 54 destination countries for
patents filed instead of 45 destination countries for granted patents). Second, we wish
to verify the consistency of our results with those of previous work which has relied on
applications rather than grants to measure transfers (Dekker et al. 2012). 6 To identify
the country where the technology was originally developed, we use information on the
inventor's country of residence.7 The resulting list of sources of relevant inventions
comprises 108 countries.
A patent is an exclusive property right granted by a state to an inventor for a
limited period of time. Since a patent is only valid in jurisdictions where it is granted,
inventors must file a patent with the competent authority in each of the countries where
they wish to protect their technology, a process known as non-resident patent filing
(NRPF) when these countries differ from the one of the inventor. NRPF has been widely
used in recent years as a measure of the transfer of new technology from source to
recipient countries (Dekker et al. 2012; Lanjouw and Mody 1996; Perkins and
Neumayer 2011; Eaton and Kortum 1999; Popp et al. 2007; Dechezleprêtre et al. 2013;
Chan 2010; Yang and Kuo 2007). 8 We follow a similar approach in the present paper,

6

The fact that a patent application is not granted by the national patent office does not prevent the

inventors from using it. The technology is unlikely to be licensed, however, meaning that technology
diffusion might be less widespread.
7

Patents with multiple inventors are counted fractionally. For example, if two inventor countries are

involved in an invention, then each country is counted as one half.
8

Another popular approach to examining the diffusion of technology is through the use of patent citations

data (e.g. Verdolini and Galeotti 2011), although this is better suited to identifying cross-border
knowledge spillovers than technology transfer via market transactions.

13
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper684

14

Dechezleprêtre et al.: Environmental Regulation and the Cross-border Diffusion of N

using the number of patents invented in country i and successfully patented in country j
as an indicator of the number of inventions transferred from country i to country j.
There are several advantages of using patents to measure technology diffusion.
First, they are available at a highly technologically disaggregated level. We can
distinguish innovations in the auto industry developed specifically to reduce pollution
whereas R&D investments, trade or foreign direct investments cannot be easily
disaggregated. Second, patents are recorded for all inventors, while R&D expenditures
is not reported for small and medium sized firms and international trade is only
reported above certain thresholds. Third, evidence shows that patents are perceived as
an effective means of protection against imitation in the automobile sector, something
which is not true in all sectors (Cohen et al. 2000).9
Using non-resident patents as an indicator of technology transfer is nevertheless
not without limitations. To start with, not all inventions are patented. The value of
individual patents is also heterogeneous. However, this is less of an issue in the present
paper to the extent that we focus not only on granted patents but also on “exported”
inventions, which are typically more valuable (Harhoff et al. 2003). Another limitation is
that, although a patent grants the exclusive right to use a technology in a given country,
we do not have any information on whether the technology has actually been used in
practice. Yet the high expense of patenting deters the filing for protection in countries
where the technology is unlikely to be deployed. In the early 2000s, filing a patent cost
around €5,000 in Japan, €10,000 in the US and €30,000 at the European Patent Office
(EPO) (Roland Berger 2005). Inventors are therefore unlikely to apply for patent
9

Cohen et al. (2000) conducted a survey questionnaire administered to 1,478 R&D labs in the U.S.

manufacturing sector. They rank sectors according to how effective patents are considered as a means of
protection against imitation, and find that the top three industries according to this criterion are medical
equipment and drugs, special purpose machinery and automobiles.
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protection in a particular economy unless they are relatively certain of the potential
market value for the technology. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that inventors do
not patent widely and indiscriminately, with the average invention only patented in two
countries (see Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011).10

5. Estimation framework
5.1 Baseline model specification: the effect of regulatory stringency
The number of technologies transferred through the patent system is measured by Pijt,
the number of patents filed in country j by inventors from country i in year t and
subsequently granted. We begin with a baseline model in which, consistent with
conventional wisdom, it is assumed that absolute regulatory stringency in the recipient
country determines inflows of patented ESTs from inventor countries. Our baseline
model specification is thus as follows:
(1)

Pijt  1 REG jt 1   2 REGit 1   Xijt   ijt

where REGjt-1 measures the stringency of regulation in country j, REGit-1 controls for the
stringency of regulation in source country i, Xijt is a vector containing the set of other
control variables, including a full set of country pair and year fixed effects, and εijt is the
error term. The regulatory variables are lagged by one year since it takes time for
foreign inventors to react to changes in regulatory standards.

5.2 An alternative model specification: the effect of regulatory distance
In order to examine the influence of relative stringency and test hypothesis H1, we
define REGDISTijt-1, which captures the difference between the stringency of regulation

10

75 per cent of inventions are patented in only one country.
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in countries i and j. Formally, REGDISTijt-1 = abs(REGjt-1 - REGit-1) where REGit-1 and REGjt-1
denote the level of regulation in countries i and j, respectively, in year t-1. The reason to
use the absolute value of regulatory distance is that we expect the impact of distance to
be negative when the distance is positive, and positive when the distance is negative,
implying that the effects would cancel each other out if distance itself rather than the
absolute value was included. A further benefit of using the absolute distance is that it
allows us to also control for both REGjt-1 and REGit-1, thereby ensuring that it is not
simply changes in these variables that are driving the results. Our specification
incorporating distance is:
Pijt  1 REG jt 1   2 REGDISTijt 1   3 REGit 1   Xijt   ijt

(2)

5.3 Control variables
We include five control variables. The first accounts for the number of relevant
inventions within the field of automotive ESTs from the source country available for
potential transfer. We measure this by PATi,t-1, comprising the number of automotive
EST inventions patented by inventors from country i anywhere in the world in year t-1.
Any invention patented in several countries is thus only counted once. We expect a
positive effect of this variable on technology transfers from country i to country j
because, all else equal, more non-resident patents should come from countries that have
a higher number of technologies available to be patented in foreign economies.
A second control variable captures the stock of relevant patents previously filed
in the recipient country j, including those by domestic inventors from country j. The
impact of this variable is theoretically ambiguous in that it could have a positive
(complementary) or negative (substitutive) effect on transfers of patented technology

16
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from abroad. On the one hand, the stock of patents is a good proxy for local absorptive
capabilities, which previous research has shown are critical for the diffusion of
advanced technologies (see Saggi 2002). On the other hand, a high existing stock of
patents may signal to foreign patent holders that the local market is already well-served
by competing technologies, such that the economic payoff from having one’s own
innovation patented in this country is small. Following Peri (2005), the patent stock is
calculated using the perpetual inventory method:
KPATj,t=(1-δ) KPAT,tj, t-1 + PATj,t
where PATjt is the number of patents filed in country j in year t. The rate of depreciation
of R&D capital, , is set at 15 per cent in our main estimations.11 To avoid endogeneity,
we temporally lag this stock variable by one year, thus including KPATjt-1 in the
estimation model.
As a third control variable, we include the number of automotive pollutioncontrol patents filed in country j by inventors from countries other than country i in the
previous year, denoted by PAT-i,t-1. These patents cover technologies that are likely to
compete with patents transferred by inventors from country i. A higher number of
competing technologies may discourage transfers. Yet they might conversely attract
more patents as firms in country i emulate their foreign competitors (Perkins and
Neumayer 2011). Since inventors from country i are unable to observe patents
simultaneously filed by inventors from other countries, we assume that they form
expectations about the number of patents transferred from other countries in year t

11

The results are robust to using 10 per cent and 20 per cent discount rates instead. We initialize patent

stocks for the year 1950 by setting the initial value in this year to zero.

17
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper684

18

Dechezleprêtre et al.: Environmental Regulation and the Cross-border Diffusion of N

based on the number of patents transferred in t-1.12 Using the lagged value PAT-i,t-1 also
avoids a potential endogeneity issue that might arise because PAT-i,t is also a function of
the regulatory level and regulatory distance.
We include two further variables to control for factors unrelated to the
automobile industry, but affecting general technology transfer between countries.
Firstly, a measure of the degree of patent protection afforded by the recipient country is
included. Several studies have shown that stricter patent laws have led to higher patent
activity, e.g., Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Hu and Jefferson (2009), Lerner (2009) and
Perkins and Neumayer (2011). We use Park’s (2008) index of patent rights, denoted by
IPRjt, which codes countries with values running from 0 (no protection at all) to 5
(highest protection).13 Secondly, in order to capture changes to the general
attractiveness of countries as locations to transfer and protect firms’ technology, we use
country j’s per capita income (GDPPCjt), with data taken from World Bank (2010). All
else equal, richer countries should attract more non-resident filings, including
environmental-related ones (Perkins and Neumayer 2011). Lastly, we control for
factors that are specific to each country and to each country-pair but do not vary across
time, such as language, spatial distance, and differences between patent offices in the
scope and definition of what can constitute a patent14, by employing an estimator that
conditions out the country-pair fixed effects. Year-specific fixed effects are used to

12

Consistent with an adaptive expectations model, we also experimented with a distributed lag, but the

data suggest that the best predictor of PAT-i,t is PAT-i,t-1. Rational inventors should therefore use PAT-i,t-1 to
predict PAT-i,t.
13

The data are interpolated to fill in gaps from missing years, but results are robust to using either the

anterior or posterior value in time to impute missing rights protection values in a country.
14

For example, it is known that patents in Japan are “narrower” being based on fewer claims to

innovation, such that the main technology may be covered by one patent in Germany and by two patents
in Japan.
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control for changes over time that affect all countries equally, such as oil prices. Table 1
presents summary variable statistics.

5.4 Estimation technique and sample
Given the dependent variable is strictly non-negative, we do not use ordinary least
squares, but a conditional fixed effects negative binomial estimator in our main
estimations. The conditioning out of country-pair fixed effects means that all country
pairs in which over the entire period there is not a single patent transfer are dropped
from the estimation.15 As there is no option to obtain robust clustered standard errors
in Stata for this estimator, we perform cluster-bootstrapping instead, which is typically
regarded as the next best alternative (Cameron and Trivedi 2009).
6. Results
6.1 Main results
Our main estimation results are presented in table 2. Column 1 shows results for our
baseline model specifications (equation 1). Consistent with several previous studies, we
find that a change in the domestic level of regulation in potential recipient country j
exerts a statistically significant impact on patented technology transfers from foreign
countries. That is, countries that increase the stringency of tailpipe emissions standards
receive more inward transfers of automotive ESTs through the patent system from
innovating countries.
Column 2 presents results for the alternative model specification given by
equation (2). Rather than absolute regulatory stringency alone, this estimation model
15

This represents roughly 40% of potential observations. These can be regarded as irrelevant country

pairs, that is, as country pairs that would never experience cross-country patent transfers from country i
to country j under any condition..
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additionally includes absolute regulatory distance as an explanatory variable, thus
allowing us to estimate the effect of regulatory distance controlling for the level of
absolute stringency in both the recipient and the source countries. Consistent with
hypothesis H1, column 2 shows a statistically significantly negative relationship for our
regulatory distance variable, indicating that the number of newly-innovated automotive
ESTs transferred between countries increases when the difference between the two
countries’ regulatory levels decreases. At the sample mean, a decrease of regulatory
distance between countries of one level on the Euro-equivalent scale (e.g. if the source
country is at Euro 2 and the recipient moves from Euro 1 to 2) is estimated to increase
the number of non-resident patents filed in the recipient country (and subsequently
granted) by 13.1 per cent.16 Importantly, once we account for regulatory distance
between source and recipient countries, the coefficient of the absolute regulatory
stringency in recipient countries becomes virtually zero and statistically insignificant.
Thus, in accordance with H1, it is regulatory distance that matters rather than absolute
regulatory stringency in recipient countries.
Turning to controls, an increase in the regulatory stringency in the source
country appears to decrease patent outflows from this country. A possible explanation
is that the introduction of more demanding regulation induces a shift of resources
towards the innovation of higher performance ESTs designed for domestic compliance,
fewer of which are suitable for markets elsewhere. Our variables capturing the number
of patented automotive ESTs available to transfer, the number of relevant patents filed
in the destination country by inventors from other countries and GDP per capita all turn
out statistically significant with the anticipated positive sign. The pre-existing stock of
relevant patents filed in the destination country also has a statistically significant
16

In Poisson and negative binomial models, coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities.
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positive effect, suggesting they function as complements rather than substitutes for new
transfers. Changes in the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs), on the other
hand, only emerge as a statistically significant predictor of non-resident filings of
automotive ESTs in column (2), being marginally insignificant in column (1).

6.2 The specificity of developed-developing country flows
Much of the debate on technology transfer has focused on the transfer of ESTs from
developed to developing countries (Ockwell et al. 2011; Gallagher 2006; IPCC 2007). In
order to explore these specific flows, as an alternative to pooling all cross-country
transfers, we examine whether the above findings hold when restricting the sample to
non-resident patents filed by OECD country residents in non-OECD countries.
As shown in table 3, we find similar results for our main explanatory variables
compared to the main estimations. As before, absolute regulatory stringency has a
significantly positive impact on inflows of patented ESTs (column 1), but the effect
disappears once regulatory distance between countries i and j is included in the model
(column 2), suggesting again that it is regulatory distance that matters rather than
absolute regulatory levels in recipient developing countries. The results for control
variables are similar with two exceptions: neither the stock of domestic relevant
inventions nor GDP per capita in recipient countries matter for flows from developed to
developing countries.

6.3 Consequences for total transfers
A key finding to emerge from section 6.1 is that the transfer of ESTs through the patent
system is influenced by relative environmental regulatory stringency in country pairs.
In particular, our results indicate that an increase in regulatory stringency will raise
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patent inflows from countries to which the recipient moves closer, but decrease them
from countries that end up further away. What this suggests is that the impact of
absolute regulatory stringency on the total number of patents transferred into country j
in year t is a priori ambiguous and will depend on the country’s regulatory position
relative to the rest of the world.
We now turn our attention to this issue, which is of primary interest to policy
makers. To do so, we move away from a dyadic (country-pair) estimation framework to
a monadic (country) time-series panel, allowing us to directly analyze the effect of
regulation on total transfers rather than transfers between country pairs. Of course, one
would expect the results from the monadic framework to be consistent with the ones
from the dyadic framework if both are properly specified. We define Pjt as the total
number of patents received by country j in year t from all other countries i: Pjt   Pijt
i j

.

We then estimate the equation:
(3)

Pjt  1 REG jt 1   X jt   jt

as the baseline model in the monadic estimation framework, where REGjt-1 measures the
stringency of the regulation in country j, Xjt is a set of control variables that include,
amongst others, a full set of country and year fixed effects, and εjt is the error term. Note
that the set of control variables is the same as before, but the available inventions are
now the sum of patents in all other countries, PAT-jt-1. The PAT-it-1 variable, which
captures transfers from other countries in the dyadic estimation framework, has no
equivalent in the monadic estimation framework and is therefore dropped from the set
of control variables. Equation (3) is estimated with a conditional fixed effects Poisson
estimator with standard errors clustered on countries rather than the conditional fixed
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effects negative binomial estimator since the smaller number of observations in the
monadic setting did not allow for cluster-bootstrapping of standard errors.
In order to explore how the effect of regulatory stringency varies according to
the relative position of the recipient country vis-à-vis source countries, we define a
dummy variable FOLLOWERjt. The dummy is set to 1 if the recipient country's
regulatory stringency is below the world's weighted average stringency. The weights
represent the relative share of countries among all EST patents transferred globally in
any one year such that the regulatory stringency of more important sources of nonresident patents counts more towards the global weighted average. We then interact
the FOLLOWERjt dummy with absolute stringency, which allows us to estimate the
effect of raising regulatory stringency in countries that are lagging behind the world’s
weighted average, versus countries that are not. This leads to the following alternative
model specification for the monadic estimation framework, which allows us to test our
second hypothesis:
Pjt  1REG jt 1   2 REG jt 1  FOLLOWER jt 1  3 FOLLOWER jt 1   X jt   jt

(4)

Results are shown in table 4. Column 1 first reports the estimation results for
equation (3), that is, for regulatory stringency without distinguishing between followers
and leaders. We find that an increase in absolute stringency has a positive, but
insignificant impact on total patent inflows for the full country sample. However, in
column 2, we estimate equation (4) and thus interact the FOLLOWER dummy variable
with regulatory stringency. The coefficient for the regulatory stringency variable itself
gives us the estimated semi-elasticity of regulatory stringency in countries that are at or
above the world’s weighted average stringency, i.e. where the FOLLOWER dummy
variable is equal to 0. This coefficient is negative, but statistically insignificant. However,
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when the stringency in the recipient country is below average, then the estimated semielasticity is the sum of the regulatory stringency coefficient plus the coefficient of the
interaction term. We find that tightening regulation by one unit increases total patent
inflows by 13.6 per cent in laggard countries (-0.072 + 0.208 = 0.136). The effect in
follower countries is statistically significantly different from the effect in leader
countries and is significantly positive at the 11% level (thus, very close to conventional
significance levels). Explicitly focusing on total inward patent transfers rather than
bilateral transfers, we therefore confirm our previous finding that the effect of absolute
regulatory stringency is conditioned by the recipient country’s relative regulatory
position.

6.4 Robustness tests
Results from a number of robustness tests for our dyadic framework estimations are
reported in table 5. In the interest of space, we only report estimates for equation (2),
which includes our main explanatory variable. In column 1, we explore whether the
effect of regulatory distance on granted patent inflows is non-linear. We include the
square term of regulatory distance to test for such non-linearity, but find no evidence
for it. The implicit assumption of a linear effect in our main estimations is thus well
supported. Our results could be spurious if our dependent variable were to simply
capture general patent flows in all technologies (rather than EST flows specifically),
which are driven by bilateral trade and FDI relationships. In column 2, we address this
concern by adding the total flow of patents from country i to country j in year t in all
technologies other than automotive emissions abatement technology as an additional
control variable. The result for the variable measuring regulatory distance between
source and recipient country is fully robust. In column 3, rather than all patents granted,
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we use flows of all patent applications to construct the dependent variable and the
controls. As mentioned previously, some patent offices do not provide information to
PATSTAT on patents eventually granted, so our sample size of destination countries
increases from 45 to 54. Another advantage of additionally analyzing patent
applications is that we can explore whether our findings hold when using a measure
similar to the one used in at least one other important study (Dekker et al. 2012). The
use of patent applications also provides a less restrictive measure of technology flows,
in that some non-granted applications may nevertheless be the result of R&D, the
product of which may be new technology previously unavailable in the recipient
country. Again, our results uphold and the substantive effect of regulatory distance on
patent applications is very close to that for granted patents as dependent variable, with
the two point estimates statistically indistinguishable from each other.
Another major concern is that our results could be spuriously driven by the fact
that EU states move together in terms of regulatory level. We address this issue in
column 4 by merging European countries into one single entity. The results are
remarkably robust to this modification. In column 5, we exclude Japan, Germany and the
US – three of the main sources and destinations of patents – from the estimation sample.
The results are fully consistent with the main estimations, suggesting they are not
driven by the presence of major source and recipient countries. The substantive effect
of regulatory distance practically doubles compared to the baseline estimation model.
In columns 6 and 7, we use alternative dependent variables, restricting the sample to
fuel injection technologies in column 6 and on-board diagnosis (OBD) technologies in
column 7. Each of these groups of technologies represent about one third of the dataset.
Again, our results for recipient regulatory distance are robust to changes in the
dependent variable.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper we use data on automobile emission standards and non-resident
patenting of associated compliance technologies in order to study the relationship
between environmental product regulation and the international transfer of ESTs
through the patent system. We find that rather than absolute levels of regulatory
stringency per se, it is relative stringency (or what we call regulatory distance) between
source and destination countries that matters for the cross-border flow of EST patents
in the automobile sector. We thus find robust evidence that countries receive more
emissions reduction technology patents where their regulatory standards become
closer to those in inventor countries. In fact, once we control for regulatory distance,
absolute regulatory stringency in potential destination countries of technology inflows
ceases to matter altogether. A possible explanation for the role of regulatory distance is
that regulation-driven demand for ESTs is more likely to be supplied by foreign
innovators where these countries have already innovated compliance technologies in
response to similar standards.
Consistent with this interpretation we find that regulatory tightening in
countries whose domestic standards are below the world average raises the total
number of patent filings of automotive ESTs by non-residents. Conversely, regulatory
tightening in recipient countries whose standards are already more stringent than the
world average does not lead them to receive more patented ESTs from abroad overall.
We caution against inferring too much from our findings. They only apply to
newly-innovated ESTs purposefully transferred through the patent system and thus say
nothing about the transfer of older technologies not covered by patents. Nor do they say
anything about the cross-border diffusion of environmentally-relevant technology
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through knowledge spillovers (Verdolini and Galeotti 2011). Moreover, our results
apply to environmental product standards in the automobile sector, such that an
important task for future research is to examine whether our findings regarding
regulatory distance apply to other sectors and apply to process-based regulations.
Nevertheless, our findings have a number of wider implications. One is that they
suggest that the cross-border flow of newly-innovated ESTs through the patent system
needs to be understood as an inherently relational process. Attention therefore needs to
be paid to relative regulatory stringency between source and recipient countries. From
a policy perspective, the results of the study suggest that accelerating the inward
transfer of new ESTs can be achieved by regulatory tightening, but only in countries
which are regulatory laggards. This would generally include developing countries
whose environmental regulatory stringency invariably lags behind the major source
countries of ESTs which are developed economies.
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Appendix 1. Definition of IPC codes (following Haščič et al. 2009 and Vollebergh
2010)

Air-fuel ratios
F01N3/05
F02M67
F02M23
F02M25
F02M3

Exhaust or silencing apparatus having means for purifying, rendering
innocuous, or otherwise treating exhaust by means of air e.g. by mixing
exhaust with air.
Apparatus in which fuel-injection is effected by means of high-pressure
gas, the gas carrying the fuel into working cylinders of the engine, e.g.
air-injection type.
Apparatus for adding secondary air to fuel-air mixture.
Engine-pertinent apparatus for adding non-fuel substances or small
quantities of secondary fuel to combustion-air, main fuel, or fuel-air
mixture.
Idling devices

Oxygen, NOX and temperature sensors
F01N11
F02D41/14

Monitoring or diagnostic devices for exhaust-gas treatment apparatus
Electrical control of supply of combustible mixture or its constituents
(introducing closed-loop corrections).

Fuel injection systems
F02M39
F02M41
F02M43
F02M45
F02M47
F02M49
F02M51
F02M53
F02M55
F02M57
F02M59
F02M61
F02M63
F02M69

Arrangements of fuel-injection apparatus with respect to engines; Pump
drives adapted top such arrangements
Fuel-injection apparatus with two or more injectors fed from a common
pressure-source sequentially by means of a distributor
Fuel-injection apparatus operating simultaneously on two or more fuels
or on a liquid fuel and another liquid, e.g. the other liquid being an antiknock additive
Fuel-injection apparatus characterized by having a cyclic delivery of
specific time/pressure or time/quantity relationship
Fuel-injection apparatus operated cyclically with fuel-injection valves
actuated by fluid pressure
Fuel-injection apparatus in which injection pumps are driven, or
injectors are actuated, by the pressure in engine working cylinders, or
by impact of engine working piston
Fuel injection apparatus characterized by being operated electrically.
Fuel-injection apparatus characterized by having heating, cooling, or
thermally- insulating means
Fuel-injection apparatus characterized by their fuel conduits or their
venting means
Fuel injectors combined or associated with other devices
Pumps specially adapted for fuel-injection and not provided for in
groups F02M 39/00 to F02M 57/00
Fuel injection not provided for in groups F02M 39/00 to F02M 57/00
Other fuel-injection apparatus, parts, or accessories having pertinent
characteristics not provided for
Low-pressure fuel-injection apparatus
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F02M71

Combinations of carburetors and low-pressure fuel-injection apparatus

Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR) valves
F01N5

Exhaust or silencing apparatus combined or associated with devices
profiting by exhaust energy

On-board diagnosis systems
F02D41
F02D43
F02D45
F02M51
F01N9

Electrical control of combustion engines; Electrical control of supply of
combustible mixture or its constituents
Conjoint electrical control of two or more functions, e.g. ignition, fuel-air
mixture, recirculation, supercharging, exhaust-gas treatment
Electrical control not provided for in groups F02D 41/00 to F02D 43/00
Fuel injection apparatus characterized by being operated electrically
Electrical control of exhaust gas treating apparatus

Crankcase emissions and control
F01M13/04

Crankcase ventilating or breathing: having means of purifying air before
leaving crankcase, e.g. removing oil

Catalytic converters
F01N3/08-34
B01D53/9296
B01J23/4046

Exhaust or silencing apparatus having means for purifying, rendering
innocuous, or otherwise treating exhaust; for rendering innocuous by
thermal or catalytic conversion of noxious components of exhaust
Separation of gases or vapors; Recovering vapors of volatile solvents
from gases; Chemical or biological purification of engine exhaust gases;
Regeneration, reactivation or recycling of reactants.
Catalysts comprising metals or metal oxides or hydroxides; of the
platinum group metals
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Appendix 2. List of recipient countries in sample
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Egypt
Finland
France

Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines

Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
South Korea
Singapore
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
South Africa
Turkey
UK
USA
Ukraine

Additional countries when considering patent applications instead of grants
Brazil
Chile
Ecuador

Guatemala
India
Indonesia

Israel
Panama
Uruguay
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Table 1. — Summary statistics
mean
8.83
1.89
1.77
0.90
1.75
6.49
4.80
4.03
9.34

Patent flowijt
Reg. recipient (REGjt-1)
Reg. source (REGit-1)
Reg. distance (REGDISTijt-1)
Inventions (PATit-1)
Knowledge stock (KPATjt-1)
Other countries’ transfers (PAT-it-1)
Patent protection (IPRjt)
Per capita income (GDPPCjt)

std. dev.
42.01
1.29
1.30
0.95
1.80
2.02
2.13
0.64
1.04

min.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.54
6.17

max.
796.83
5
5
5
6.59
9.30
7.72
4.88
10.91

Notes: N = 18741. GDP per capita is in constant 2000 US dollars. GDP per capita and all patentbased variables (except the dependent variable) are logged.
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Table 2 — Main estimation results
Model
Reg. recipient (REGjt-1)
Reg. distance (REGDISTijt-1)
Reg. source (REGit-1)
Inventions (PATit-1)
Knowledge stock (KPATjt-1)
Other countries’ transfers (PAT-it-1)
Patent protection (IPRjt)
Per capita income (GDPPCjt)
Observations
Country-pairs

(1)

(2)

0.0596**
(0.0291)
-0.0797***
(0.0277)
0.1060***
(0.0184)
0.4030***
(0.0516)
0.2345***
(0.0287)
0.1111
(0.0737)
0.2083***
(0.0524)

0.0068
(0.0315)
-0.1307***
(0.0203)
-0.0831***
(0.0265)
0.1111***
(0.0180)
0.4028***
(0.0514)
0.2274***
(0.0292)
0.1224*
(0.0735)
0.1835***
(0.0518)

18741
1276

18741
1276

Note: *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1%
level. The dependent variable is the number of patents transferred from country i to country j in
year t and subsequently granted. The models are estimated using a conditional country-pair
fixed-effects negative binomial estimator and include a full set of year dummies (not reported
for brevity). Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3 — Estimation results for developed-developing country flows
Model

(1)

(2)

0.0946**
(0.0396)
-0.1125*
(0.0675)
0.0188
(0.0257)
0.1925***
(0.0517)
0.2637***
(0.0300)
0.0652
(0.1681)
-0.1564
(0.0999)

-0.0741
(0.0649)
-0.1963***
(0.0754)
0.0340
(0.0860)
0.0218
(0.0261)
0.1999***
(0.0532)
0.2561***
(0.0306)
0.0458
(0.1706)
-0.1476
(0.0987)

4287
303

4287
303

Reg. recipient (REGjt-1)
Reg. distance (REGDISTijt-1)
Reg. source (REGit-1)
Inventions (PATit-1)
Knowledge stock (KPATjt-1)
Other countries’ transfers (PAT-it)
Patent protection (IPRjt)
Per capita income (GDPPCjt)
Observations
Country-pairs

Note: *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1%
level. The dependent variable is the number of patents transferred from country i to country j in
year t and subsequently granted. The models are estimated using a conditional country-pair
fixed-effects negative binomial estimator and include a full set of year dummies (not reported
for brevity). Cluster-bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4 — Total patent inflows
Model
Reg. recipient (REGjt-1)
REGjt-1 * FOLLOWERjt-1

(1)

(3)

0.1157
(0.0828)

0.0006
(0.0007)
0.4688***
(0.1102)
0.7081**
(0.3091)
0.7464
(0.9316)

-0.0723
(0.0906)
0.2083**
(0.0834)
-0.6461**
(0.2523)
0.0006
(0.0006)
0.4293***
(0.1075)
0.6283**
(0.3050)
0.5964
(0.8604)

675
45

675
45

FOLLOWERjt-1
Inventions (PAT-jt-1)
Knowledge stock (KPATjt-1)
Patent protection (IPRjt)
Per capita income (GDPPCjt)
Observations
Countries

Note: *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1%
level. The dependent variable is the number of patents transferred to country j in year t and
subsequently granted. The models are estimated using a conditional country fixed-effects
Poisson estimator and include a full set of year dummies (not reported for brevity). Standard
errors robust and clustered by country reported in brackets.
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Table 5 — Robustness tests
Model

(1)

Reg. recipient
(REGjt-1)
Reg. distance
(REGDISTijt-1)
Reg. distance squared
(REGDISTijt-1)^2
Reg. source
(REGit-1)
Inventions
(PATit-1)
Knowledge stock
(KPATjt-1)
Other countries’ transfers
(PAT-it-1)
All other transfers

0.0034
(0.0332)
-0.1115**
(0.0460)
-0.0093
(0.0230)
-0.0829***
(0.0263)
0.1108***
(0.0179)
0.4037***
(0.0517)
0.2275***
(0.0292)

Patent protection
(IPRjt)
Per capita income
(GDPPCjt)
Observations
Country-pairs

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.0012
-0.0265
0.0301
-0.0448
0.0331
0.0275
(0.0284)
(0.0176)
(0.0588)
(0.0311)
(0.0410)
(0.0290)
-0.1063*** -0.0935*** -0.1471*** -0.2600*** -0.0829*** -0.1213***
(0.0184)
(0.0139)
(0.0470)
(0.0271)
(0.0287)
(0.0312)
-0.0301*
(0.0170)
0.1775***
(0.0213)
0.2766***
(0.0523)
0.3900***
(0.0332)

0.0925**
(0.0441)
0.1650***
(0.0307)
0.0006
(0.0544)
0.2696***
(0.0376)

-0.0524
(0.0471)
0.1907***
(0.0195)
0.3925***
(0.0520)
0.2030***
(0.0328)

-0.2237*** -0.2311***
(0.0329)
(0.0409)
0.2635*** 0.0967***
(0.0247)
(0.0213)
0.3506*** 0.4251***
(0.0542)
(0.0644)
0.2904*** 0.1603***
(0.0435)
(0.0401)

0.1233*
(0.0737)
0.1858***
(0.0521)

-0.1060***
(0.0238)
0.0293
(0.0185)
0.3714***
(0.0491)
0.0797**
(0.0342)
0.2559***
(0.0193)
0.1090
(0.0677)
0.1570***
(0.0500)

-0.0293
(0.0683)
0.2308***
(0.0536)

0.6246***
(0.1581)
-0.4064***
(0.0645)

0.1674*
(0.0937)
0.1657***
(0.0596)

0.1907**
(0.0912)
0.2105***
(0.0602)

0.2554*
(0.1313)
0.1218*
(0.0736)

18741
1276

18741
1276

28287
1935

6480
448

15639
1066

10527
718

11730
798

Note: *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable is the number of patents
transferred from country i to country j in year t and subsequently granted except in column 3, where the dependent variable is the number of patent
applications transferred from country i to country j in year t. In column 4, EU15 countries are considered as a single entity. Column 5 drops Germany,
Japan and USA from the sample. Columns 6 and 7 restrict the sample to patents related to fuel injection technologies and on-board diagnosis systems,
respectively. All models are estimated using a conditional country-pair fixed effects negative binomial estimator with cluster-bootstrapped standard
errors in parentheses. All models include a full set of year dummies (not reported for brevity).
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Figure 1. Number of adopters of Euro-equivalent standards in OECD countries
1992-2007

Source: Authors, based on Perkins and Neumayer (2012)

Figure 2. Number of adopters of Euro-equivalent standards in non-OECD
countries 1992-2007

Source: Authors, based on Perkins and Neumayer (2012)
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